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1TOWARDS A COGNITIVE THEORY
OF THE FIRM
Issues and a logic of change1
third version, june 1996
Bart Nooteboom2
e-mail b.nooteboom@bdk.rug.nl
SOM theme B: Inter-firm Coordination and Change:
Marketing and Networks
Abstract
The paper consists of three parts. The first part gives an inventory of issues that no cogni-
tive theory of the firm can ignore. These are grouped into three themes: aspects of
development, issues of coordination and philosophy of knowledge and language. The
second part of the paper tries to develop a general logic of change, and to make this logic
more determinate and rigorous with the aid of the notion of scripts. The third part gives an
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2introduction to implications and applications for the theory of the firm and for
management.
3Introduction
There are three important developments in the view that economists take of the firm.
One is that they are prepared to drop the notion of the 'representative firm', a d to
recognize that within an industry there are significant differences between firms:
firms have distinctive competenci s. The second is that economists are increasingly
prepared to open up the black box of the firm, and to recognize issues of
coordination between different entities and activities inside the firm. The third
development is that transaction cost economics (TCE) has generated a growing
recognit on of forms of organization 'between market and hierarchy'.
Firms are striving under a regime of rapid change in technology and
markets, with an increasing focus on innovation, learn ng and forms of cooperati n
between firms. In view of this, it is absurd that economics does not contain a well-
developed theory of cognition and evaluation, by people and firms, in interactions
between them.
There is an extensive business literature on learning in and by firms (see the
special issue of Organization Science: 'Organizational Learning: Papers in honour
of and by James G. March' 1991; and for a more extensive collection of papers:
Cohen and Sproull 1996). But this literature tends to neglect issues in the philosophy
of knowledge and language, and perhaps partly for that reason lacks an integrative
conceptual framework (Huber 1996). This is understandable if we look at the
breadth and depth of issues and literatures that would need to be taken into account
in a more full and systema ic cognitive theory of the firm. Yet, in my view this
complexity has to be accepted. The present paper discusses some of the main issues
that such a theory should address, provides the outlines of a theory that integrates
these themes, and indicates some implications and applications. The text will be
fairly compact; a full discussion requires a book. Here, the resource and competence
based view of the firm (Penrose 1959; Foss 1993) is taken for granted: the firm has
competencies, based on resources, embodied in various forms of capital (financial,
human, social), which to a greater or lesser extent are idiosyncratic to the firm. It is
such unique capabilities of firms that allow them a basis for profit.
4The methodological orientation of the paper is evolutionary, in the sense that
it looks at processes rather than only outcomes (such as equilibrium outcomes that
mainstream economics focuses on), and in the sense that it will investigate process in
terms of the central evolutionary concepts: sources of variety, selection and trans-
mission. Does the composition of industries change by the adaptation of firms or by
evolutionary pressures eliminating maladapted firms (Hannan & Freeman 1989)?
The received view in the literature on organization l learning (Cohen and Sproull
1996), is that both mechanisms apply; they are complementary (Levinthal 1991).
Note, however, that although in economic evolution we can recognize the central
evolutionary concepts of variety, selection and transmission, there are many crucial
differences between economic and biological evolution (de Bresson 1987). In
particular, in economic evolution the behaviour of the phenotyp (e.g. the firm) is
not entirely 'hardwired', like instinctual behaviour in animals, but is amenable to a
certain amount of 'reprogramming', by strategic re-orientation ('organizational
learning'), and thereby has a much wider scope for adapting to the selection
environment. Also, the selection environment, consisting of markets and institutions,
is not as autonomous as in biological evolution. It can to a greater or lesser extent be
transformed by firms' strategies: advertising and brand name, innovation, collusion,
political influence. This latter point has been relatively neglected, but not, for
example, by Prahalad and Hamel (1990), and the earlier Austrian school in
economics, who emphasize entrepreneurial capabilities to create new conditi s in
technol gy, markets or institutions.
The disciplinary orientation of the paper is both economic and sociologic l,
in the sense that it looks at the goal directedness and creative freedom of actors as
well as the way in which creation is governed by institutions. Thus it tries to sail
clear of both the economic vice of methodological individualism and the sociological
vice of methodological collectivism.  
Part 1 of the paper indicates a number of issues that a cognitive theory of
the firm should take into account. To give some sense of order, we group the issues
into three main themes. First, the different aspects of development that should be
taken into account, concerning information, knowledge and learning. Second, since
5we are dealing with multiple people, and multiple firms, there are issues of
coordination, within and between firms, and the role thereby of markets and market
failures. Third, we cannot evade philosophical issues of knowledge, language and
meaning, individual and society, freedom and determinism. Further, to give some
sense of direction, we indicate for each issue in those themes what role it is expected
to play in the cognitive theory of the firm: as a problem to be solved or clarified, as a
basic principle, as a concept to be used, as a method, etc. The basic, possibly heroic,
hypothesis is that connecting and integrating these themes and issues there is an
underlying 'deep structure' or 'logic of change' that we should try to discover.
In Part 2 the makings of such a logic will be sketched. The main conceptual
instrument we use is that of a 'script', taken from the cognitive science literature.
This notion serves two important purposes. The first is to solve the multi-level
problem (or 'aggregation problem', as an economist might call it) in the step from
individual learning to learning on the firm level, while at the same time establishing a
link with the processes, in particular the primary process of production, that take
place in the firm. The second is that it provides a basis for identifying, reconstruct-
ing and connecting different types of learning.
In Part 3 we give a preliminary discussion of some applications of the
scheme.
Part 1: ISSUES
1.1 Aspects of development
One theme consists of the different aspects of development that are relevant. The
issues here are: the tension between continuity versus change (or exploit tion versus
exploration), the identification of different forms of knowledge, types and degrees of
learning and stages in the development of people, firms, technologies, products and
markets.
6Continuity and change
Change (or exploration) is required because conditions change. On the other hand,
some stability or continuity is required to apply what one has learned (exploitatio )
(March 1990, Holland 1975). In evolutionary parlance: a certain amount of
continuity in the modus operandi of a life form is required, as a basis for
assimilating resources from the environment in order to maintain itself sufficiently to
achieve procreation.
In biology, novelty arises from the random appearance of new forms of life
(by mutations and pairings of parental genes). These will achieve a larger share in
the total population to the extent that they have greater 'fitness' to the selection
environment. The life forms cannot significantly change the selection environment to
their advantage. They adapt to the environment rather than vice versa. In 'population
ecology' (Hannan & Freeman 1984), a similar approach was taken to industries,
where adaptation takes place only on the industry (population), and not on the firm
level. In economics, entrepren urship has been recognized as a source of variety; of
the production of novel forms. There is a debate to what extent it is random and to
what extent directed on the basis of intentionality and insight.
In more recent thought, and in evolutionary models (Boyd & Richerson
1985) allowance is made for a greater or lesser adaptability of firms: the abil ty to
adjust their modus operandi to changes in the environm nt, and to transmit
successful adaptations (Lamarckian inheritance). Thus, firms are seen as striving to
achieve sufficient continuity, in order to utilize resources for the production of added
value, as well as a sufficient ability to adapt to changing conditions. The mix of
continuity and change that is most conducive to survival depends on the variability
of the environment: more stability allows for more continui y; more variability
7requires more adaptation3. But there is an unresolv d tension between the two: how
can  change and continuity be reconciled?
In evolutionary theory more g nerally there is a tension between continuous
and discontiuous or punctuated evolution ('saltation'), or evolution versus revolu-
tion, or cumulative versus structural change. Economics contains a tension between
equilibrating (Walrasian) and disequilibrat ng (Schumpeterian) entrepreneurship.
The latter remains a mystery. Schumpeter himself failed to endogenize invention: to
him it was still like the drop of a stone in a tranquil pond, where one could subse-
quently study the ripples of diffusion. Is innovation inveterately exogenous, bound to
remain a mystery, or can it be shown to somehow emerge from past practice? A
paradoxical question is: if saltation is exogenous and cannot be explaied, such a
'deus ex machina' is quite unsatisfactory, but if it can be reconstructed endogenously
from what existed before, how can it still be discontinuous? 
Adaptation by firms is associated with 'organizational learning'. In the
literature a distinction is made between two levels: 'single loop' vs. 'double loop'
(Argyris and Schön 1978), or 'first order' vs. 'second order' learning (Fiol & Lyles
1985, Hedberg, Nystrom and Starbuck 1976); 'exploitation' vs. 'exploration' (March
1990, Holland 1975). These dichotomies mean (approximately?) the same thing: in
order to survive, a firm must have both sufficient continuity in its modus operandi to
achieve efficient production (single loop, first order, exploitation). But a firm should
try to adapt its modus operandi to changed conditions (double loop, second order,
exploration). One of the central tasks of contemporary management is to achieve an
adequate balance between the two. Perhaps the most important challenge in the
theory of organizatonal learning is to elucidate the relation between the two levels of
learning: how do they relate in the process of firms' operation and development? Is
second order learning exogenous, or does it somehow emerge from first order
learning, so that they can somehow be combined and no longer need to constitute a
dilemma? How does this work?
                    
3
 This does not imply that firms will in fact adapt more quickly and frequently. As Heiner
(1983) pointed out, if the demand for adaptation greatly exceeds the ability to adapt,
behaviour may become more rather than less stable: one renounces the ff rt to adapt.
8In view of the point made earlier, I would like to add 'transformation' to the
notions of exploitation and exploration : the ability of firms not only to refine or
optimize their modus operandi, and to adapt it to changed conditions, but also their
strategic ability to adjust the selection environment to their modus operandi, to a
greater or lesser extent.
Role in the theory: problem to be solved or clarified.
Forms of knowledge
It is useful to distinguish data, information and knowledge. To understand these
concepts, we need a theory of knowledge (epistemology), and a theory of language
and meaning (semiotics). We discuss those later, but have to anticipate a bit on them
here. Data are literally 'givens': external sign material produced by events. Events
include actions, which include gestures and utterances by people (sound making,
writing), which include pronounceme ts (use of language), which include
propositions (pronouncements that are carriers of truth values). The data from
pronouncements are grammatical and syntactic structures of 'signifiers' that are used
to express intended meaning ('signified').
People possess cognitive structures for perception, interpretation and
evaluation. Perception produces data for interpretation. Interpretation entails the
production of meaning, which transforms data into information, by fitting it into a
stock of knowledge. Understanding connects and transforms information into beliefs
or claims of causal or deductive insight. Knowledge is a meaningfully ordered stock
of information (interpreted data), and understanding, plus ability to transform it into
actions (skill), which yields performance. In saying this, I endorse the pragmatic
approach to knowledge, which goes back to Wittgenstein (1976) ('meaning as use')
and before that to the pragmatist philosophers (notably Peirce 1957). Apart from
other philosophical merits of this view, a reason to include performanc  in the
concept of knowledge is that one cannot judge knowledge apart from the judgement
of performance. A second reason is that it fits well with the competence view of the
firm. The third part of cognition, evaluation, entails a matching with goals and
9values; a judgement of goal congruence. Perception, int rpretation and evaluation
plus skill to perform and commitment to goals yield action.
The economic and organizational literatures recognize that knowledge can
be embodied in different ways: built into hardware (machinery, instruments),
encoded in documents (including electronic information carriers such as tapes, discs
and computers), absorbed by people (including teams of people). This does not
imply that in the process of embodiment nothing is lost or added. On the contrary:
something is always lost or left out, and things may be added, in the process of
transfer of knowledg  into a machine, a code or people. In particular, tacit elements
are left out. The notion of 'tacit knowledge' will be discussed presently. For a further
understanding of this we will later go deeper into language and semiotics.
From the work of Michael Polanyi (1962, 1966, 1969), the literature
adopted the notion of tacit knowledge, which is embodied in people in such a way
that it cannot easily be 'transcripted' into a code. This applies in particular to skills
and to innovative practices, as we shall see later in our theory of learning. As an
innovation 'settles down' into a 'dominant design', it can more easily be transcripted
into documents, which then become data for other people. Before that, when
knowledge is still tacit, it can be transf rred only by imitation of the person or team
that carries it, or by bodily transfer of the latter. The data are then uncoded,
perceived bits of performance. But tacit knowledge may also be in the nature of a
'routine' that has become 'second nature', even though originally it had the form of an
explicit, documented rule of conduct. In that process also things may have been left
out or added. Thus, there is transition from tacit to documented knowledge, and vice
versa (cf. Boisot 1995). The latter makes sense in view of 'bounded rationality' (in
the sense of bounded cognitive capacity): in order to reserve capacity for the non-
routine that demands attention, the routine subsides into non-awareness (Simon
1983). But this yields the problem of continuity versus adaptation that we indicated
above: the tacit may be difficult to adapt.
The distinction between tacit and documented knowledge is close to the
distinction between 'procedural' and 'declarative' knowledge (Cohen & Bacdayan
1994, Cohen 1991; the distinction seems identical to the distinction between 'non-
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canonical' and 'canonical' knowledge employed by Brown & Duguid, 1991).
Procedural knowledge constitutes an ability or skill to perform some activity. It
tends to be implicit and tacit. Declarative knowledge constitutes explicit knowledge
of facts, causal relations, etc. For knowledge to be document  it would first need to
be declarative. One can have the one without the other. One can ride a bike without
being able to explain how. Procedural knowledge tends to be retained longer than
declarative knowledge. Having learned a language, later one can often recognize
whether a sentence is well-formed, without recalling the grammatical rules for
sentence formation (Cohen & Bacdayan, 1994). Then one can say that one knows
the grammar in the procedural but not in the declarative sense.    
Role in the theory: these concepts form elements for building the theory  
Types and degrees of learning
Learning is growth of knowledge: gaining more interpreted data (information), or
gaining understanding (claims of deductive or causal ordering), or gaining skill to
perform. In modern mainstream economics there is recognition of the importance,
cost and possible lack of information (search costs), and of different types of l arn-
ing: learning by doing, imitation, search and formal learning. A similar distinction is
made in the organizational literature. Learning by doing and imitation typically yield
tacit, procedural knowledge, and search/formal learning is typically associted with
the absorption of explicit, documented, declarative knowledge.
The term 'learning by doing' is ambiguous. One interpretation is: learning in
the form of increased efficiency as a function of cumulative practice. Another inter-
pretation is: novel ways of doing things that emerge from the practice of existing
ways. The two are quite different: the first is a matter of narrowing; of eliminating
steps that are redundant, or replacing ill-fitting elements by better ones, thus making
a process more efficient. The second is a matter of widening one's perspective; of
groping for novel combinatio s to arrive at a new practice. Both have their place in
development, but they are not the same. We return to this in the later elaboration of
a 'logic of change'. The discussion leads us to the notion of what we call (for want of
a better term) degrees of learning.
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Different degrees of learning are recognized. In non-mainstream economics
there is a recognition of developments within a 'technological paradigm', and shifts
of such paradigms (Dosi 1984). This idea was taken from the philosophy of science
of Kuhn (1962) with his notions of 'normal science' within a scientific p radigm, and
'revolutionary' shifts of such paradigms. As we noted before, in the organizational
literature, there is a distinction between 'single loop' versus 'double' loop learning
(Argyris & Schön 1978), or 'first order' vs. 'second order' learning (Fiol & Lyles
1985, Hedberg, Nystrom and Starbuck 1976); 'exploitation' vs. 'exploration' (March
1990, Holland 1975). We hold these distinctions to be synonymous, and use the
terminology of 'first and second order learning'. First order learning refers to the
refinement and consolidation of existing cognitive structures, which is exhibited in a
better performance of existing practice ('doing things better'), while 'second order'
learning refers to the emergenc  of a novel practice ('doing better things'). It is also
referred to as cumulative versus transformation l learning, and then seems similar to
the development within paradigms and the shift of paradigms. It seems to be related
to our earlier distinction between learning in the form of increasing efficiency of an
existing practice, and learning in the form of grasping for novel combinations in a
newly emergin  practice.
In both non-mainstream economics and organizational theory, there is a
further division into three degrees of learning. In the organizational literature actions
are seen to result from rules, which are based on insights, which are in turn based on
principles. First order change involves a change of rules, called 'improvement',
second order change involves a change of insights, called 'renewal', and third order
change involves a change of principles, called 'development'  (Swieringa &
Wierdsma, 1990). In non-mainstream economics, a distinction is made between
'parametric change', which involves novel substitutions into given variables in a
given structure, 'strategic change', which involves 'rearranging capabilities within
existing boundaries', and 'structural change', which involves a change of boundaries
(Langlois & Robertson, 1995). 
Note that the distinction between first and second order learning is close to
the opposition between continuity and adaptation. First order learning maintains
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current ways of doing things, while second order learning shifts them. Thus it is as
urgent to clarify the relation between first and second order learning as it is to clarify
the relation between continuity and change (or between structure and process). The
need for some balance between stability and adaptation supports Kuhn's argument
for the rationality of a certain extent of theoretical conservatism in science. You do
not and should not surrender a given 'paradigm' too soon. Not before the cumulative
weight of anomalies with the existing paradigm has in some sense become excessive,
and the indications towards a viable replacement are available. In organizational
theory the relation between different degrees of learning and the issue of continuity
versus renewal constitutes a major issue in the development of a 'learning
organization'. Here, as more generally in the debate on continuity versus saltation,
the different degrees of learning or evolution are presented as different, separate
categories. Second order learning in organizational theory remains as mysterious as
Schumpeterian entrepreneurship in economics. We need to show how they are
related; how adaptation builds on continuity, and preserves sufficient continuity for
adequate performance along the way. This is the main task of our later 'logic of
change'.
Role in the theory: elements that are to be used but also clarified
Stages of development
The question arises whether perhaps different degrees of learning form stages in an
overarching process of cognitive development, with in later stages higher degrees
building on lower degrees of learning. Insight into such a process may help to clarify
the issue of continuity and change.
The next question could be whether such a process bears similarities to life
cycle theories of firms and products. In life cycle theories of the firm, an initial
entrepreneurial stage of innovation, with an improvisational, informal and ad hoc
way of doing things, is followed by consolidation into more determinate
organizational structures and more managerial, formal, documented procedures and
planning (Churchill & Lewis, 1983; Scott & Bruce, 1987). The problem then arises
how after that stage a bureaucratized firm can still produce innovati n.
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In product life cycle theory, a 'fundamental' innovation, in the form of a new
function or a radically new way of performing an existing function goes together
with an initial phase of consolidation, with the development of a 'dominant design',
followed by a stage in which attention shifts to greater efficiency by means of
process innovation, and in which the market for the new product is expanded. This
goes together with a wearing out of initial innovation monopoly, as a result of
imitation by new entrants, and a resulting pressure on price, and pressure to reduce
costs. One opportunity for this is to employ the expansion of the market to utilize
economies of scale. This goes together with fast growth or take-over of successful
entrepreneurs from the innovation stage. The basic technology has become standard,
with a consolidation of tacit knowledge into documented and more easily diffusible
knowledge.
Next, due to ongoing pressure on price, there is a tendency to differentiate
products, in order to escape from pure price competition, to the extent that the
market offers a potential for it. Whether the industry integrates or disintegrates in
these stages depends on the possibility to separate different steps in the overall
production process, by modularity on the basis of diffused know-how and standards
for interfaces (Langlois & Robertson, 1995). At the end of the life cycle, the next
innovation forms a substitute, and only small residual 'niche' markets remain, which
tend to be exploited by small firms, who in that stage no longer face the disadvan-
tage of diseconomy of small scale, and are less able to latch on to the novel
innovation (Nooteboom, 1984a). 
Is there, perhaps, some fundamental 'logic of change' underlying all these
phenomena, as well as learning by people and firms? This may seem too heroic an
hypothesis, but I will undertake it anyway.
Role in the theory: areas of application.
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1.2 Coordination
The second theme consists of modes, levels and problems of coordination, within
and between firms. This relates to issues concerning the 'boundaries of the firm'.
Between firms it is related to 'governance between market and hierchy'. This
includes problems of 'spill-over', the role of distance, in a spatial but also in a
cognitive and a cultural sense, in the coordination of activities, and the relations and
differential advantages of small and large firms.   
Institutions
Usually, institutions are defined as 'rules of the game' that constrain and/or direct
actions of people. Thus they may serve to align cognition and ac on, in or between
firms. They are also needed to constrain transact on costs within and between firms.
This does not imply that existing institutio  do in fact limit transaction costs. They
may have arisen for the protection of vested interests, by raising entry barriers, or if
designed to limit transaction costs they may not succeed or may even have adverse
effects (Nooteboom 1996c).
Transaction costs are costs in the different stages of an exchange process:
contact, contract and control. Contact costs are costs of search for an exchange
partner, and of judging the quality of his offer or the nature of his needs. Contract
costs are costs of drawing up a contract or other device of 'governance', prior to
transaction, in order to enable control after the transac ion. Control costs are costs
of monitoring the performance of the partner, and influencing it to align it with one's
own interests. Institutions may reduce transaction costs by a reduction of search
costs (e.g. by some information technology and policy), or a reduction of contract
costs (e.g. by a legal framework), or a reduction of behavioral uncertainty (e.g. by
standards for conduct, or norms and ethics for 'normal conduct', as a basis for trust).
 Institutions may subside into tacit habits or routines. Again, the advantage
of this is that it allows for attention to be paid to non-routine, more urgent matters,
and thereby economize on bounded cognitive capacity. Nelson & Winter (1982) go
so far as to define institutions as routines. While I recognize the importance of
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habituation in the regulation of conduct, I will not go along with this, since it is
useful to allow for non-routine institut ons. For example: deliberate, conscious
efforts to install institutions such as the design of laws, mechanisms of social
control, the building of trust. They may after a while become tacit and routine, but
often are not so at the start. 
Role in the theory: it is used to explore the role of organizational culture and other
instruments in the management of learning.
Multiple levels
An obvious point is that learning appears to be an attribute of people, not firms, so
that learning by the firm must be reconstructed from learning by people. This issue
of the relation between person and firm has also been called the 'micro-
micro'problem. The point that there can be no firm learning without personal
learning seems inescapable, but some qualification is required, if the point is taken
to go so far as to say that on the firm level there is nothing like a cognitive d ntity,
and that firm cognition is a mere aggregate of personal cognition. Learning on the
firm level may lie for the greater part in a re-arrangement of patterns of interaction
between people rather than learning by those people. But admittedly, such re-
arrangement is likely to work only if at the same time people adjust to the novel
arrangement, and in that sense learn.
In the literature on artificial intelligence, one research tradition sees human
cognition as a network phenomenon. Even in an individual, the notions of personal
identity and memory, seen as constituting some 'core' in the form of an indivisible
unit, are problematic. Memory and other parts of a person's psyche are distributed in
the nervous system. If a firm is seen as a network of informational n des in the form
of people, combined with firm-specific institutions that constrain and guide their
interaction, then metaphorically a firm may have an identity no less than a person,
whose identity is also composed from a network of informati nal nodes (Noot-
eboom, 1996a). We identify organizational culture with an institution in the form of
a set of firm-specific symbols, (role)models and rituals that in some way constrain
and direct the activities of the people involved, in particular their cognitive activities
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(perception, interpretation, evaluation). As such, it contributes to a cognitive identity
on the firm level.
Clearly, this does not eliminate the need to deal with issues concerning the relation
between individual and collective learning in an organization. And there remains the
fact that next to their organizational roles, people retain their identity 'qua persona'
(Smith Ring & van de Ven, 1994). Personal interests and perceptions will diverge to
some extent from shared ones. Indeed, the creative potential of an organization may
lie in such diversity. Here again we come up against the issue of continuity versus
adaptation. Organizational structure and culture may be directed to reduce that
variety, for the sake of coherence and continuity, but alternatively culture may be
directed at 'second order or third order' learning on the basis of individual variety.
We will return to this crucial issue later.
We can carry the neural network metaphor further, beyond organizations
into networks with organizations as nodes, and consider the possibility of a
'cognitive identity' of such a network, the tension between continuity and adaptation
on that level, and the possible role of something like 'network culture'.
In a theory of the firm, we need to incorporate actions of people in the
context of 'primary processes': the stream of entities in a process of transformation
which adds value. The entities may be materials or goods (factory, transport, ...),
people (transport, shop, restaurant, hospital, ...), information (insurance, banking,
engineering, consultancy, ...), or, generally, combinations of them. In particular,
information flows will accompany any primary process. In addition to these
processes there are 'secondary processes' of support (finance, personnel, purchasing,
R&D, general management), which in themselves entail processes of transformation.
One way of visualizing this is Porter's (1985) 'value chain'. It is especially in such a
constellation of processes that the link between the level of people and the level of
the organization arises.
Role in the theory: a crucial issue to be resolved.
17
Boundaries of the firm
Our cognitive approach will add considerations on the boundary of the firm to
already existing insights, and for this it is useful to give a summary of those insights.
As indicated by Langlois & Robertson (1990, 1995), in the economic
literature there are two approaches towards the boundaries of the firm: from the
perspective of ownership and from the perspective of coordination. These are to a
large extent inspired by notions from recent streams in economic thought: 'property
rights', 'nexus of contracts', 'transaction costs', which entail issues of 'incentive
alignment', 'bounded rationality, impacted information', and ensuing problems of
'measurement and monitoring'; 'specific assets' and ensuing problems of 'hold-up',
etc. Ownership is understood as the possession of 'residual rights' (revenues after
deduction of claims from 'specific rights' allotted to suppliers of capital or services).
Coordination is associated with 'hierarchy', i.e. direct control of performance, with
an authority to demand the provision of information and compliance to agreements
which would not stand up in court vis-a-vis an outside firm.
A standard argument in favour of the market, in the form of non-integrated,
specialized production in firms under separate ownership and coordination, is that it
stimulates effort since one is responsible for one's own survival as a firm, and one
has to compete with alternative suppliers. In other words: the market provides
stronger incentives for effort.
Some arguments for integrating different activities under unified ownership
or coordination are related to the notion of 'complementary assets' or 'economy of
scope': when combined in a unified process, certain products can be produced more
efficiently, or certain production factors can be used more productively. Such
economy of scope is 'inseparable' if it does not obtain if the assets are separated in
some sense. The question is: in what sense? Separation in time and/or place, in
coordination or in ownership?  
In a static setting, integration of activities under unified or shared owne ship
may be required in the case that assets or products are complementary, and the
monitoring of performance is problematic. Then in order to ensure incentives in the
utilization of such complementary assets, that party should have ownership in terms
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of residual rights, whose performance is most difficult to monitor by outsiders. With
specific rather than residual rights, that party is most tempted to shirk. A further
reason for integrated ownership may lie in strategic considerations: take-over a
potential competitor to foreclose competition, or as an alternative for a cartel when
that is precluded by law; backward integration to ensure priviliged access to a
source of inputs; forward integration into distribution channels to prevent free riding
in the maintenance of a brand name (Daems 1983), or to establish impacted
information vis a vis consumers on the basis of exclusive distribution (Francis
1983). As pointed out by Teece (1986), in a more dynamic setting of innovatio , it
may be necessary to keep the exploitation of an innovation within the firm where it
was generated, if there is no other way to appropriate the rents from the innovation.
In the case, for example, that there is insuffic ent patent protection, or insufficient
control of compliance to licensing agreements.
Unified coordination of complementary assets, in a 'hierarchy', may be
required in a static setting under several conditions. One is the presence of
inseparable economy of scope, in the sense that activities can be performed more
efficiently under unified coordination than when separat d. This may occur in
production, but especially in R&D (interaction with engineering, marketing and
purchasing). Note that this does not imply that a complementary asset should also be
owned by the coordinati g agency. Integration in ownership is required if it is
impossible to hire in the complementary factor from an outside firm on a spot basis.
This may be so because it is part of the idiosyncratic competence of the focal produ-
cer, and therefor  simply is not available outside. Or less extremely: fo  reasons of
learning some continui y in the provision of the factor is needed to realize the
economy of scope, or it requires specific investments on the part of the supplier, to
ensure consistent coupling with the producer's process. As discussed in the previous
section, integration in ownership may be needed if even under integrated
coordination monitoring is problematic. In particular, integration may be needed to
prevent hold-up (misuse of dependence of the partner) in case specificity of
complementary assets yields switching costs that punish exit from the relation,
which then is no longer viable as a deterrent of hold-up.
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In a dynamic setting, Langlois & Robertson (1995) pointed out that if
different steps of a value adding process are systemically linked, then change in each
should be kept in unison with change in contiguous steps, and this may require
integration under unified coordination, due to 'dynamic transaction costs' (defined as
problems and costs of transferring new knowledge to others; or coordinating across
different sets of knowledge). When change is minor, and kept within existing
standards for interfaces between the steps, disintegrated change is feasible. But when
change is more fundamental, and interfaces have to change along with steps, unified
coordination is required. However, Langlois & Robertson (1995: 135) recognize that
there also is 'a kind of radicalness ... that large organizations do not handle well. For
this type of uncertainty, a decentralized network does much better'.
In a dynamic setting there is a dilemma of 'focus versus scope' (Nooteboom
1992a), which is connected to the dilemma of exloitation and exploration. On the
one hand, to achieve anything, and to have any hope at winning races in technologies
and markets, firms must focus on activities where they have or can achieve com-
petitive advantage ('core competencies'). On the other hand, firms must maintain
sufficient scope of monitoring developments that may yield opportunities r th eats.
I proposed (Nooteboom 1992a) that this dilemma can be solved by employing
outside firms as sources of information and learning, in the utilization of 'external
economy of cognitive scope': firms can employ the complementarity of knowledge
between firms, arising from diversity in the path-dependent development of
knowledge. Such cooperation can take a variety of forms: equity integration (sales of
assets, merger/acquisition, equity joint venture), but increasingly also, or even
preferably, non-equity forms, such as licensing, franchising, or partly non-
contractual forms of cooperation in R&D, product development, distributio ,
export/import (Contractor & Lorange 1988). I briefly summarize the reasons for this
(Nooteboom 1992a).
Due to rapid technological development and 'globalization', firms increasin-
gly find themselves engaged in races: in keeping up with technology and in getting
novel products to market. It is facilitated by the development of information and
communication technology, which reduces transaction costs and shifts markets more
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in the direction of the economist's ideal and the business man's nightmare of perfect
competition. Information about supply and demand is more rapidly and more
adequately acquired (search costs decline). Management can more easily coordinate
activities across large distances (coordination costs decline). Thus there is more
pressure and more opportunity to locate activities where they are most efficient. As a
result of globalization, there are several pressures towards radical product differenti-
ation. Technological development, in particular information technology, yields
flexible methods of production, and acts as an enabling cause4. Individualization of
consumer behaviour provides a market opportunity for differentiated products.
Increased competition provides an incentive, to reduce pressures of price
competition by means of product differentiation. But radical product differentiation
greatly increases the complexity of both input and output markets, and to be
'sustainable' (Zuscovitch 1994), it requires that firms concentrate on core competen-
cies, and outsource as many activities as possible. In particular, rather than claiming
to have full competence in all dimensions of their products and production
processes, firms should make use of the specific competencies of suppliers not only
in production, but also in the process of research and development. Rather than
making blueprints of required inputs that are 'thrown over the wall' to suppliers,
there should be 'early supplier involvement' in the design process (Helper 1991,
Lamming 1993). As a result, next to the central competence of achieving an
adequate balance between exploitation and exploration, and indeed as part of that
competnce, a crucial competence of management now is its ability to design a good
architecture of relations inside and outside of the firm (Kay 1993). 
The mutual entanglement of firms further increases the specificity of invest-
ments in the transaction relation. As indicated in transaction cost economics (TCE),
this yields dependencies and risks of 'hold-up', which raises complic ted issues of
'governance' of relations between formally independent but materially dependent
firms, in forms of organization 'between market and hierarchy' (Williamson 1985).
                    
4
 In particular information technology: programmable machines, computer aided design,
simulating rather than building prototypes, etc.
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However, in the present paper I will not deal with the complicated issues of
governance of inter-firm relations in any detail (for that, see Nooteboom 1995).
In the transfer of knowledge to partners, one should take into account that
there is a danger of 'spill-over': of crucial knowledge, which forms part of one's
competitive advantage, spilling over through the partner to a competitor. Therefor ,
the conditions for spill-over and ways of controlling it should also be part of the
cognitive theory of firms.
Role in the theory: Area of application.
1.3 Philosophical issues
This theme includes epistemology (philosophy of knowledge) and related
philosophical issues of language and meaning, and issues concerning the relation
between individual and society, and between freedom and determinism.
Epistemology
Any theory of information, knowledge and learning is based, explicitly or implicitly,
on some epistemology. A hesitation to enter the thickets of this branch of philosophy
is understandable. One can ignore the issue, but this only results in the tacit use of
some epistemology that is taken for granted and is not subject to critical reflection
and debate. A crucial issue, in particular, is the old philosophical question whether
we can assume intersubjective knowldge hich constitutes objective truth. Can we
know reality as it is in itself, and do we in fact have such knowledge for at least part
of reality (in the form of indubitable facts)? The philosopher Kant already gave a
negative answer. To say yes to this is to adopt the stance of metaphysial realism.
This, in fact, is the stance of mainstream economics5. Modern mainstream
economics accepts that there are costs involved in acquiring information (search
                    
5
 Which is not to say that economics is realistic in its assumptions. It is to say that
economics traditionally assume  implicitly that people have cognitive access to reality as it
independently from their cognition, yielding intersubtively identical knowledge. This is
not realistic. Cf. Hodgson (1988) & Nooteboom (1992a).
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costs), which form part of transaction costs. There is recognition of 'bounded
rationality', which then mostly means 'lack of information'. It is on the basis of this
implicit epistemology that economics, up to and including rational expectations
economics, holds on to its core concept of rationality: information, in so far as
available, is used 'correctly', and no systematic 'errors' are made in the making of
choices or in the making of probabilistic assessment and predictions. Lack of 'errors'
in choice here means compliance with the axioms of choice, such as transitivity of
preference. Lack of such transitivity would entail an 'error', but this is assumed not
to occur.
In fact, it has been argued before that if we accept that products are to be
seen as a bundles of characteristics along different dimensions of utility, as a point
in a Lancasterian product characteristics space, intransitivity may quite plausibly
occur (see e.g. Nooteboom, 1984b). But more fundamental, and much less debated,
is the assumption that there is a well-defined 'correctss' in the use of information.
In my view we cannot get around the Kantian problem that we perceive,
interpret and evaluate the world on the basis of categories of cognition (embracing
perception, interpretation and evaluation) on the basis of categories, which prevent
us from seeing and understanding the world 'as it is in itself'. I subscrib  to the line
of thought in 'constructivist' epistemology, or he 'interpretive approach' (Berger &
Luckmann 1966), related to the perspectiv  of 'symbolic interactionism', according
to which categories of cognition evolve (somehow) from interactin with the
physical and social environment. This perspective goes back to G.H Mead (1934).
This entails path-dependence of cognition, and a lack of shared perceptions and
understanding between subjects to the extent that their cognition evolved under
different conditions and in isolation from each other.
In this perspective, data have significance, i.e. constitute informaon only
relative to cognitive categories, and as a result data supply different information to
different people. As a result, the notion of some objectively given 'correct use' of
information is utterly problematic. The very notion of information as something
apart from people to which it constitutes information, is problematic.
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The constructivist perspective is relativistic in the sense of making meaning
and understanding relative to categories, which differ to a smaller or greater extent
between people. It is not relativistic in the sense of seeing no perspective for critical
debate; for an intersubjective basis for correcting idiosyncratic error. While facts are
always to some extent 'theory laden', they are intersubjectively more stable and
reliable than theoretical speculation. This is perhaps best explained from an
evolutionary perspective: facts have surived longer, in more different contexts, in
more selection environme ts of intersubjectiv  debate, than novel theoretical
speculation, and are in that sense more reliable. But they are not reliable in any
absolute sense: they may be mistaken, and the theoretical speculation that they claim
to falsify may later turn out to be consistent with experience in a different
interpretation. Only evolution in the longer run will show (and even then not in
absolute terms).
Role in the theory: basic principles of knowledge.       
Language and meaning
Since in human systems learning and communication are hard to separate, a learning
theory of the firm can hardly evade issues of linguistics and semiotics. We need to
examine those issues to proceed with the issue of intersubjective correction of
idiosyncratic error indicated in the previous section.
Communication requires language, which contains a te sion between the
intersubjective order that it provides ('langue', in Saussure's terminology), and
without which there would be no mutual understanding, and idiosyncratic language
use (Saussure: 'parole'), without which meanings would not change and innovation
would be impossible (Saussure 1915). Langue provides the basis for
communication, and parole its source and agent of change.
In communication there is a sender, who engages in 'speech acts', where he
exercises parole in first forming an idea of what is to be communicated: the
'signified'. This is encoded by means of 'signifiers' taken from langue (lexicon and
grammar). For the receiver this is at first a mere datum. If it can be absorbed, i.e.
when it 'fits' into 'cognitive structures for the production of meaning', it becomes
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information for the receiver, where the receiver infers ('produces') a signified, to be
taken up further into cognitive processes. What do we mean by 'cognitive structures
for the production of meaning'?  
Elsewhere in the theory of language, a distinction has been made between on
the one hand 'reference' (with its synonyms 'denotation, extension'; Fr ge:
'Bedeutung'), and on the other hand 'sense' ('intension'; Frege: 'Sinn')6. Reference is
that which a term refers to, which may be an individul or a set of individuals, and a
truth value in case of a propositi n. According to Frege, sense refers to how
reference is given or identified ('Die Art des Gegebenseins'). R ferece is subject to
intersubjectivity and argument, in the 'context of justification'; in langue. Sense, on
the other hand, is idiosyncratic, and rooted in personal experience, and produces
parole. It resides 'in the context of discovery', and is a source of both error and
innovation. Or, to put it differently: sense constitutes what we indicated before as
'production of meaning' for an actor. It is through sense that the recipient in
communication infers the signified from signifiers. Along these lines, which are
certainly subject to further elaboration, the connection between parole-langue and
sense-reference emerges. In Evolutionary parlance: in langue, intersubjective
matching of reference constitute  the basis for selection7. Langue also provides the
vehicle for transmission, as a fund of signifiers, while sense provides the basis for
absorption, or the inference of signified from signifiers. Thus langue and parole
jointly provide and determine transmission. But parole also is the source of variety.
Thus we arrive at an evolutionary theory of language.
There is a problem of communication across different sets of knowledge,
which yields 'dynamic transaction costs'. In a radical form, it may yield what Kuhn
called 'incommensurability' between different paradigms, if they entertain different
                    
6
 Cf. Geach & Black (1977); Thiel (1965).
7
 This is probably connected with Habermas' notion of "communicative action"
(Habermas, 1982).
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ontologies8. Radical impossibility of communicatio  is unlikely to the extent that
there is any commonality in the history of the development of cognitive categories in
at least partly overlapping worlds and cultures. But there may be serious difficulties
in bridging the gap between those who have grasped some novelty, but cannot
explain it (even to themselves) in terms of existing categories. Here, metaphors are
needed as a bridge between the existing and the new. As a result, especially in early
stages of innovation, debate will tend to be metaphorical rather than literal.
Metaphors are needed for heterodox parole to make a claim to at least temporary
tolerance in langue. Information, i.e. literally the result of 'making sense', i.e.
signifieds inferred from signifiers, is never identical between subjects. Even identical
twins will have non-identical sense, due to even minor differences in experience.
     I propose that this conceptualization of language is useful, if not essential,
for connecting the following issues in our cognitive theory of the firm: continuity and
adaptation, culture and the micro-micro problem. As follows: In organizations, the
issue of continuity and adaptation in firm conduct and cognition is strongly
connected to the scope for parole (change) versus the contraints of langue
(continuity), regulated by culture, in generating aggregate firm behaviour from
personal conduct.
The issue concerning the relation between an individual and its interlocutors
extends from the relations between people in a firm to the relations between firms,
and the issue of the boundaries of the firm. In the multi-level theory that we need to
develop, we must not only lift cognition from the level of the individual to that of the
firm, but also lift language to communicative interaction between firms. Our theory
of learning should extend across boundaries of the firm to market processes.
Here, there appears to be a connection  with the old Austrian notion of the
market as a 'discovery process'. However, the cognitive perspective of the Austrians
was both shallow and narrow, in that it lacked both psychological depth and sociolo-
                    
8
 Perhaps we could say that they are incommensurable in the sense of yielding different
quantification in the logical sense (classes of existents in presumed worlds). This incom-
mensurability seems clearly related to Quine's (1960) notion of the "inscrutability of
reference".
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gical breadth , as was argued by Woo (1994). The Austrians (Von Mises, Hayek)
are said to be subjectivists, but in fact the Austrian subject remains a black box. She
was put on a pedestal, to be revered rather than studied. She is supposed to be
rational, self conscious and creative. She does lack information, but 'picks it up'
from the market, which is seen as a discovery process. Prices signal scarcity, and
guide the entrepreneur in her search for profitable enterprise. Even in Schumpeterian
economics, innovation is exogenous, as an unexplained emergence of 'novel
combinations'. The formation of perception, knowledge, insight and evalution, nd
the role of interaction between people, are absent from the theory. So, while in the
later development of neo-classical economics the subject was ushered out, in the
transition from considerations of utility to a pure logic of choice, in Austrian
economics she is present but empty: there is no theory of how subjects develop
knowledge and form preferences. Furthermore, in Austrian economics the subject is
sacrosanct, autonomous and in no way formed by her environment. In this, Austrian
economics is as much based on methodological individualism as neo-classical econ-
omics is: no allowance is made for effects of socialization, intersubjective interaction
or institutions on the formation of knowledge and preferences.
Role in the theory: basic principles of communication.
Freedom and determinism
Finally, we face the perennial issue of choice versus determination, which is closely
associated with the division between economics, with its methodological
individualism, which implies complete individual freedom, and sociology, with its
methodological collectivism, which implies a degree of determinism. The question is:
if we find a social and psychological mechanism which forms knowledge and
preference, and a subsequent mechanism of choice, to what extent is that choice still
free? If we can reconstruct processes of high degree learnin , and innovation, to
what extent is the outcome of such processes still novel?
The answer is in fact a simple one: One can very well hope to specify a
logic of change, in the form of meta level principles that form the basis of a process
of development, without claiming to be able to predict the outcome in any specific
27
case. On the basis of well specified principles there may be chaotic outcomes, as
chaos theory has demonstrated.
Role in the theory: Problem to be clarified; area of application.
Part 2: DEVELOPMENT
Now I try to set up a logic of change, which elaborates, clarifies and integrates the
themes set out in Part 1. The central purpose is to describe the process by which on
different levels (people, firms, networks of firms) higher degrees of learning (second
order, third order, strategic, structural, transformational, developmental) emerge
from lower degrees (first order, parametric, improvement), and thereby clarify the
relation between continuity and change.
2.1 A logic of change
Novelty does not spring forward ready-made and out of the blue. This happens only
in the ancient Greek myth of the goddess of war and wisdom Athena springing fully
armed from the brow of Zeus. New things (concepts, products, technologies) at the
outset tend to be indeterminate. They emerge as a groping at hints of something new;
as intuitions that need to be elaborated and made more firm. When a person acquires
a new practice, this tends to be ill-defined and messy, with encumbrances from
previous practice, and lapses back into that more familiar practice. This is most
pronounced in the case of learning from practice: a novel way of doing things seems
to suggest itself, but it is not clear why or how precisely it should work. An inventor
once exclaimed: 'I have got it, but I do not know how to get it'. But also in formal
learning the phenomenon of initial confusion and stumbling arises, and practice is
needed for the novel activity to be mastered smoothly. Repeated trials and applica-
tion are required to find out what properly belongs to the novel practice and what
not. In innovation, time and experimentation are required to arrive at a 'dominant
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design'. The emergence of one outcome among possible alternatives may be
influenced by chance and coincidence, such as the availability of adequate materials,
skills, instruments, etc. This may lock development into a path that under later
conditions is not optimal. Let us call this development from an indetermin te to a
determinate novelty the consolidation stage, as the first stage of development.
This first stage is characterized by increasing efficiency from a process of
narrowing; by elimination of what step by step is found out to be redundant. It is
associated, I propose, with the 'experience curve' in economics, which is also, and in
the present context confusingly, called the 'learning curve' (Yelle 1979). I propose
that this corresponds to the notion of the emergence of a 'dominant design', and of
'standard operating procedures' (SOP). These then serve as 'prototypes' for fu ther
applications. Perhaps this is also associted with the concepts of first order, or
parametric or improvement learning: learning to conduct an existing practice more
efficiently by optimal substitution into given variables in a given structure.
After the novelty has settled down, and 'come into its own', one could not
possibly step directly to the next novelty. Such a leap is difficult to imagine. First of
all, there is Kuhn's argument, indicated before, that it would be uneconomic to
switch to a novelty as soon as the first failure of the existing practice appears. One
does not throw away one's present tools until a better replacement is at hand. Thus
instant falsification of theory, as a perhaps too simplistic reading of Popper would
seem to require, is uneconomic. And one would not survive with such change
without continuity. Evolution would eradicate such jumps into the dark without
taking time to exploit what has just been achieved. Secondly, one would have no
clue where to look for the next novelty. I propose that one needs more or less
extensive practice, to accumulate the incentive from failures, and to develop hints
and elements for the configuration of the next novelty. Let us speculate how such a
process is likely to proceed, if due to evolutionary pressures it is to proceed
effectively and efficiently.
The most straightforward way to explore the limits of effectiveness or
validity of an existing practice, and at the same time survive by ongoing production
on the basis of resources and methods at hand, is to generalize the application of the
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practice to novel areas. This what we see in individual development as well as
development of firms and markets: attempts are made to carry a successful practice
into neighbouring areas of application. This second stage we call the stage of
generalization.
Next, it is to be expected that as one moves to novel contexts, the practice
needs to be differentiated to fit into them. Here, the process of narrowing by
eliminating redundancies, in the first stage of consolidation of novelty, is reversed
into a process of widening into different versions and extensions of the novelty.
Perhaps this is to be associated with second order, or 'strategic' or 'renewal' learning,
in which variables are re-arranged within a given structure. This third stage we call
the stage of di ferentiation. In this stage chance plays a significant but limited role:
the extent and direction of differentiation depends on the direction and scope of
generalization.
As the area of application is expanded, differentiation messes up the clarity
and efficiency of the existing concept or practice, and failures to perform are
accumulated. Furthermore, the practice impinges on the areas of application of other
practices, that before seemed quite unrelated to present practice. Failures of one
practice are compared with successes of the practices it has come in contact with,
and speculations and trials arise concerning possible re-combinatio s of elements
from different structures. Perhaps this can be associated with third order, 'develop-
mental' or 'structural' learning, in which experiments a e made with unorthodox
novel combinations of elements from different practices. This fourth stage we call
the stage of 'reciprocation'. In this stage the importance of chance increases: we are
in the field of serendipity. Connections between different bits of experience occur
more or less at random. However, they are not completely random: the scope for
recombination of elements is determined by the variety of differentiation in the
previous stage. The (more or less) random combinations are idiosyncratic: different
people will consider different connecti s; most of them without much useful effect.
Most people will have tasted the sweetness of beet root. But it took an
entrepreneurial leap of imagination to get the idea of developing sugar beet as a
substitute for cane. In this way, reciprocation provides the source of variety that is
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required for evolution. When a random combination with potential occurs, it is not
easy to identify, since it literally does not make sense; it cannot be recognized. A
handful of people stumbled upon X-rays, but only one saw what it might mean, and
its implications might be. 
This process of groping around novel combinations may hit upon successf l
performance. Then, we are back at stage one, but at a 'higher' level of developm nt:
a consolidation of something new that is as yet indeterminate, fuzzy, ad hoc, and
unexplainable, since it extends beyond established meanings and corresponding
categories, but perhaps intuitable by means of metaphor.
Such a cyclical process of development seems consistent with the exigencies
of survival: it indicates a path along which one can proceed from what exists
towards novelty, in a way that satisfies the need for present production along the
way, while building up the incentives, hints and elements of novelty along the way,
and thus reconciles the exigencies of both continuity and change. I note that the
process corresponds point by point with Jean Piaget's notion of stages of 'assimi-
lation and accommodation' (Piaget 1970, 1974)9. In its emphasis on the interaction
with practice as a source of learning, it has affinity to the approach of Kolb (1984).
In its recognition of the creative role of randomness, serendipity and metaphor (in
the stage of reciprocation) it has affinity to Nonaka (1991, 1994).
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 After an accomodative shift of categories of understaning, there are subsequent stages
of assimilation: repetition and recognition (to make the novel category more determinate),
generalization, differentiation and "reciprocation" with other categories, which provides
hints for a reconfiguration into a novel category. Piaget's theory was inspired by his
experiments in the development of intelligence in children. We will not enter upon the
debate to what extent the theory is in line with the empirical evidence, and the
methdologiocal adequacy of the experiments (see Flavell, 1967). In fact, my proposal for a
"logic of change" was inspired by the work of Piaget, as I described earlier (Nooteboom,
1992a, 1989). But here I want to present it independently from the work of Piaget, as a
reasonable hypothesis that ties in with the issues discussed in Part 1.
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2.2 Scripts
Before attempting empirical tests, we should try to make the 'logic' more clear,
determinate and rigorous, by some appropriate means of formalization. I will not be
able to develop the argument fully in this paper, but I take a step in that direction by
trying to apply the notion of a script. I will not be able to explore its applications
extensively.
Research in cognitive psychology and linguistics indicates that the develop-
ment of mental categories (things by which we identify and classify objects) is not
simply a process of checking features of an object against a list of features required
for class membership (Neisser 1987). Categories are not simple sets of entities with
a list of attributes, but 'graded structures' (Rosch 1978). In categorizatio , attempts
are made to fit things into a connected and ordered conceptual structure which can
be seen as a network. A theory is a highly developed and explicit form of network.
 A script is a specific case of such a conceptual network (Abelson 1976,
Shank and Abelson 1977). As illustrated in figure 1, a script consists of a sequence
of nodes. With these nodes correspond sets of events or actions, which allow for
different 'permissible alternatives' or 'functional equivalents', or 'functional
complements', called 'terms', that may be substituted into he nodes (like values into
variables in a mathematical formula).
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figure 1: script
         script                script1  script2  script3
           ³  /                    ³      ³      ³    
           ³/                      ³t     ³t     ³t   
      node *--- substitutable   ---*------*------*- reference
           ³\      terms t         ³      ³      ³ line for t
           ³  \                    *      *      ³    
      node *                       ³      ³      ³    
           ³                       ³      ³      ³    
           *                       ³      ³      *    
           ³                       ³      ³      ³    
           ³                       ³      ³      ³    
The sequence may be temporal, logical or causal. Scripts may not be like
trees: branches may fold back to the trunk, as illustrated in figure 2.
Scripts are schemas for both understanding and behaviour. This pairing of
understanding and behaviour connects with the view, proposed among others by
Wittgenstein (1967), that to understand something is to be able to correctly perform
a practice. This aligns with the American tradition of pragmatism. I propose that
understanding an event or behaviour is the ability to fit it into a script. Information
is data fitted into scripts. Having knowledge is having scripts, which form a
behavioral repertoire. A script is cued by a 'script pointer', which activates the script
as guide for behaviour or a basis for understanding by fitting events into the script.
The latter process is called 'assimilation'.
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figure 2: folding back
node A
node B         node C
node D
Consider this example taken from Shank & Abelson (1977). In a dinner
script, the nodes may be courses and a set of terms could be, for example, the set of
alternatives we could use for butter, and complements of butter such as a knife (or
the latter's functional equivalents). Or the set of things we might put on our bread
(cheeses, meats, jams, etc.) in a subsequent node.
Scripts are found to play an important role in the construction of categories
and meaning. Young children are found to classify objects not according to dult
abstractions such as form or material, but according to their place in scripts. Not
metal spoons, boxes, hammers, pans; not round objects of wood, metal, plastic, clay;
but wooden spoons, metal forks, plastic plates and linen napkins, in an eating script.
As illustrated in figure 1, a term may be a substitute into nodes of different
scripts, and these are connected with what I call a 'transscript reference line'. This
choice of terms is related to the application of scripts to language. I propose that in
many cases texts also can be modelled as scripts, and that this can be used to clarify
the notions of meaning and language that we indicated before: langue/parole;
intension/extension10. Grammar and syntax provide the rules for forming the axis of
the script, with its sequence of nodes. A lexicon provides rules for substit tion into
                    
10
 It was used for this purpose also by de Saussure (1915).
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the nodes. An individual act (including 'speech acts' and acts of production in a firm,
or transaction between firms), constitutes a substitution into a node in a script.
Intersubjectively shared scripts of communication constitute language, as those in
production constitute established technology.
Posner (1989) characterized a text as an artifact, instrument and coded
meaning. Unlike a script, in its most abstract definition a text is not necessarily
sequential. For the moment, I stick to scripts and their sequentiality. Going though a
text is the performance of an ability to absorb it. When a text contains a sentence,
this is sequential, and grammar and syntax provide the rules for forming the axis of
the script, with its sequence of nodes. A lexicon provides rules for substit tion into
the nodes. Substitution entails reference. The class of substitutions constitutes the
reference of a term. Hence the use of the term 'reference line' in figure 1.
An individual speech act (parole), like acts more in general (includi g cts
of production in a firm, or transaction between firms), constitutes a substituon into
a node in a script. Intersubjectively shared scripts of communication constitute
langue. Correct reference ('truth') is judged on whether parole is consistent with
langue; i.e. whether substitutions into shared scripts are 'permissible'. Permissibility
is primarily judged on whether the substitution works. This links back to our
pragmatic interpretation of meaning and truth. In any script, each node will in
general have a range of permissible functional equivalents, which may be interpreted
as synonymous terms, but in princile the synonymy is restricted to the node in that
script: synonimy depends on context. Parole is produced on the basis of sense, which
arises from personal experience with scripts. In personal experience, scripts are
derived from intersubjectively shared scripts (langue), but are adapted in idiosyn-
cratic practice. Practice with the use and adaptation of scripts yields 'sense': the way
in which people decide upon substitution into nodes ('reference'), as a basis for
parole. The process of adaptation and development of scripts is described in the
following paragraph. Personal adaptation of scripts is a source of variety and hence
of innovation.
The construct of a script is of interest also in economics and business, to
model both consumption and production. In consumption it indicaes that some
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product has utility to a user only to the extent that it fits into nodes of the user's
scripts. In production it models the sequencing of activities on the basis of
complementary assets, in the primary processes of transformations that add value.
The complementarity of nodes in a script, and the possible complementarity of
substitutions into a node, connects with the notions of 'complementary assets' and
'economy of scope' in economics.
 We can also use scripts to reconstruct the role of metaphor. A metaphor
provides a link between two previously unconnected fields of meaning (Miall, 1982;
Neisser, 1987). In metaphor, a given subject ('principal subject', 'tenor', 'target') is
talked about in terms ordinarily used to describe a subject of another type
('secondary subject', 'vehicle', 'base'). The tenor is represented in a new light, in
terms of the vehicle. Or, in other words, a concept (vehicle) is applied to something
(target) outside of its ordinary domain. Metaphor can now be interpreted as substitu-
tion across scripts: a term that is normally substituted in a node in a 'base' script, in
'proper referenc ', is substituted into a different 'target' script. Metaphors can
develop further into analogues or models, as more and more is carried over from
base to target: nodes or parts of scripts. 
Summing up: the notion of a script can be used to reconstruct
categorization, primary processes of adding value, and meaning. Thus it may
provide help for the ambitious effort to provide a unified theory of learning by
people and firms. Below, I further develop the application of the notion of scripts to
organizations.
2.3 Development of scripts
Now we will see how scripts emerge, evolve and develop to yield novel scripts, and
how this may elucidate the process of the different stages of development proposed
before.
A novel, recently invented script is indetermiate and unstable in the sense
that the identification and sequencing of nodes, and effective substitutions into them
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are unstable: best practice is not yet clear. As application proceeds, in the stage of
consolidation, more insight is gained from repeated trials in the context in which the
script was first conceived and found to be successful to some extent. By
experimentation, the best sequencing and substitution  are established, and this
yields what was earlier called a 'dominant design' or 'best practice'. Efficiency
increases by the elimination of redundant nodes and inappropriate substitutions, and
a narrowing down to optimal and parsimoniou  procedures.
In the next stage of generalization, the script is applied in novel contexts.
This leads to differentiation in the form of:
Parametric differentiation: different substitutions into nodes in different contexts.
For example: to adjust for differences in capabilities of labour in different contexts,
or in sources of energy, or in available m terials, or in technology of maintenance
and support, technical standards, etc. A more specific example, using the restaurant
case, would be: paying by plastic money (card) rather than cash, in the payment
node of the script. Note that the emergence of such a new substitution generates an
extension of the reference of plastic money: it can now also be used in restaurants.
This type of change appears to be equivalent to the earlier notion of 'parametric
change', and therefore we adopt that term for this form of dif erentiation.
Structural differentiation: different sequencing of nodes, dropping r adding nodes,
or even different sets of nodes, in different applications. These are called different
'tracks' of the script. A example in the restaurant script is that there are different
tracks for a self-service diner and a service restaurant: in the first one pays before
and in the second after eating and seating. Or, more radically, to a drive-in
hamburger shop, where entry and seating is replaced by staying in the car. If
assimilation fails, i.e. one cannot fit an event into any script, one is facing a puzzle
or anomaly. Events that should but do not fit into a given script are 'tagged' onto the
script, in a fund of unsolved puzzles.
Reciprocation: a script becomes connected, in at least one of its branches, with at
least one branch of another script, first by shared substitutions into nodes and next
by shared nodes (i.e. sets of substitution ). For an example in the restaurant case,
perhaps (this was not checked for historical accuray), self service restaurants
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emerged from self service grocery shops when those started to offer ready-made
food. Ready made food is then shared between the shopping and the restaurant
scripts.
Invention: triggered by reciprocation, nodes or branches from diverse scripts are
reconfigured into a new script.
Consolidation: at first the novel script is messed up with mismatches between
elements from the original scripts. Nodes or substitutions are included that do not
belong, or nodes are put in the wrong order. But there is no existing norm or model
to identify this, and increase of effectiveness or efficiency is a matter of learning by
doing. After elimination of inappropriate elements, in a 'cleaning up',  this yields the
standard, paradigm form or 'prototype' of the srcipt.
The process is illustrated in figure 2.
figure 3: development of scripts
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Invention can occur on different levels. It may lead to differentia ion in the form of a
branching of an existing script. In the restaurant case: the reciprocation b tween a
self service shop and restauant in the sharing of ready-made food may have
triggered the idea of a self service restaurant. Note that in this way the 'trans-script
reference lines' (figure 1) may form a trigger for reciprocation, leading to invention:
the sharing of a term between scripts may stimulate the carry-over of an in some
way related term from one script (base) to the other (target), in an act of metaphori-
zation. 'In some way related' here can mean: the term carried from base to target in
the base is a substitute or a complement for the term that was already in common, in
relation to a given node in the base. Or the element that is carried over can be related
as follows: a whole node (or other part of a script) is carried from the base to the
target.
Note that I use the term 'invention' rather than 'innovation' advisedly, in
accordance to the distinction made by Schumpeter: it constitutes a new way of doing
things, but it still needs to prove its viability to be called an innovation. In terms of
my analysis: it still has to go through the initial stage of consolidation.
Invention can also yield more fundamental novelty. This notion of different
degrees of invention and innovation is also part of the innovation literature. For
example: the leap from service to self service shopping required a substitution of
movement of products, fetched from shelves by a shop attendant for a waiting
customer, by movement of customers making their selections from the shelves. In
terms of scripts: in a given script (shopping) terms (products, consumers) were
switched between nodes (movement, waiting). This may be triggered by
reciprocation from a script in which it was normal practice to have consumers rather
than products move. For example: fresh conscripts filing past a line of bits of
uniform and other gear to compose their sack.
  Note that in our analysis there is an important relation between the stage of
reciprocation and the role of metaphor. In fact, one could say that the one constitutes
the other, if we employ the definition of metaphor as 'cross-script substitution' that
we gave before. The importance of metaphor for innovation was recognized in a
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recent article by Nonaka (1995). In the later stage of consolidation, the metaphor
develops into what is then seen as literal description.
Part 3: APPLICATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
Now we proceed to implications and applications. They are many, and here we can
only give some preliminary indications. First, we consider to what extent we are now
able to solve the puzzles set out in Part 1. Next, we consider implications for the
conceptualization of production processes, and in that context the management of
people, the notion of the identity of the firm, and boundaries of the firm.
3.1 Puzzles
The main puzzles we identified in part 1 were: the relation between continuity
(exploitation) and change (exploration), and the multi-level problem of learning on
the levels of people, organizations and networks of organizations.
We identified different stages of developm nt, which to a considerabl
extent reconcile the demands for both continuity and change. One can continue the
exercise of present scripts while adapting them along the steps of consolidation,
generalization, differentiation, reciprocation and invention. We need to investigate
further how this is to be managed. We turn to that in the next paragraph.
From the start, we took the resource based view of the firm for granted: the
firm consists of an idiosyncratic set of competencies based on partly non-contestable
resources (financial, human, social). In Part 1 we indicated the neural network
metaphor of the firm. With the notion of a script we now proceed from that
metaphor to a model. We might characerize a firm as a set of scripts that have
evolved: in the form of primary processes, secondary supporting processes, other
communicative relations between people. Behind those are the scripts that constitute
the cognitive categories of people that affect the organization. But f cognitive
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categories are scripts, perhaps we can turn the notion around to say that scripts with
nodes that include activities of people communicating with each other also constitute
the cognitive categories of the firm, transcending those of the people in it. In other
words: the firm has a cognitive identity in the form of scripts with people
constituting nodes or contributing actions to nodes. We note also that a node in a
script, when scrutinized under a magnifying glass, in turn consists of scripts. This
suggests a fractal structure, with possible chaotic and indeterminate traits of
cognition11. We need to investigate further how, more precisely, firm level conduct
and cognition arise from the level of people; how this relates to communicati n in
the firm, and between firms. This is related to the previous question how to manage
people in scripts, and the role and working in this of culture and other institutions.
Concerning carriers of data or knowledge, in Part 1 we recognized
hardware, documents and people. Knowledge being contingent upon categories, the
data carried can become information and next knowledge only if they can be fitted
into the cognitive scripts of those who receive and the carriers. This is a further
elaboration of the notion of 'absorptive capacity' (Cohen & Levinthal 1990). Now
we add organizational scripts as carriers: organizational procedures, partly
embodied in organizational structure. In other words: the memory of an organization
is distributed across documents, installations, memory of people and organizational
scripts.
Is there anyone who has the categorial scripts to fit the constellation of
organizational scripts into; to make sense out of them and understand them?
Probably not: who could that be? It may be the task of management to fulfil that
function, and they will be able to grasp some subscripts, but they also contribute to
nodes and are themselves part of scripts. In that sense, an organization cannot make
sense to itself; does not fully know what it is doing. For that, outside consultants
may be of some help. That also is why organization l development is largely based
on self-organization, in the forms of developing scripts, according to the process set
out above. The process can be influenced not by specifying target outcomes, but by
                    
11
 The possible connection with fractals was suggested by Lászlo Pólós.
41
affecting the underlying drivers of the process: consolidation, generalizt on,
differentiation, reciprocation.
The non-contestability of at least some of the resources of the firm is consis-
tent with our constructivist epistemology: cognitive competence is based on catego-
ries, and competence in general on scripts, that have been developed in learning by
doing, in interaction with the physical and social environment. That implies that
actors have different competencies to the extent that they developed in different
environments, and that one cannot simply buy into another's (cognitive) competen-
cies, if one's own cognitive categories cannot absorb the products of the others'. It
also implies the danger that one cannot perceive what lies outside the scope of one's
cognitive competence. However, there is a need for a focus of activities. One cannot
do everything well, and to have a chance of surviving in technological and
commercial races one must concentrate on one's core competencies. This yields the
notion of the 'firm as a focusing device' (Nooteboom, 1992a). But focus of
perception and competence implies the risk of not perceiving and reacting to relevant
threats and opportunities. This problem is related to the earlier problem of continuity
versus change. How does a firm reconcile the tension between focus and scope, and
between continuity and change? While we have a basis for an analysis of these
questions, we still need to build on it.
In particular, an important question is whether there is any single, universal
way to manage, regardless of circumstance? And can a firm be managed in a single
fashion that applies to all parts of it? (Nooteboom, 1989, 1992b; Weick, 1982).
What if one part of the organization is in the stage of consolidation, which requires a
narrow focus, and another in the stage of reciprocation, which requires tolerance of
more or less chaotic variety? How can one manage the balance between continuity
and change in different parts of a firm, and what are the implications for the
boundaries of the firm? We will return to these issues later.
For further research, the question also arises how the theory can be further
formalized, beyond the mere notion of scripts, to yield an improved account of their
dynamics. This will be needed to develop a true 'logic of change'.
42
3.2 Organizational scripts
Now, following Gioia & Poole (1984), I apply scripts as representations of compet-
encies in organizations, in the form of processes of adding value, which constitute an
organization's 'cognitive repertoire'. I propose that the notion of a script is useful for
a conceptualization of knowledge and competence, which clarifies a number of
important issues in organizational learning. If cognitive categories of people are
scripts, perhaps we can turn the notion around to say that scripts with nodes that
include activities of people communicating with each other constitute the cognitive
categories of the firm, transcending those of the people in it. In other words: the firm
has a cognitive identity in the form of scripts with people constituting nodes or
contributing actions to nodes (Weick & Roberts 1993). This cognitive identity is
close to the culture of a firm (Cook & Yanow 1993). This solves a problem in the
literature, which has often backed away from the idea that organizations have
knowledge, in some sense, other than some unspecified aggr gate of the knowledge
of individuals in the organization, and it also goes beyond simple, unreconstructed
analogies between learning on the level of individuals and on the aggregate level of
the firm (Cook & Yanow 1993).
The notion of an organizational script constitutes a further refinement of the
notion of organizational routines from the literature (Cyert & March, 1963; Nelson
& Winter 1982). In a primary process (the process of adding value), the axis of a
script repres nts a stream of entities, that undergo transformation in nodes of the
script. The entities may be goods, people and information. There may be parallel
scripts or bits of scripts, and they may merge or deviate at nodes. For example, in an
airline script we have streams of passengers plus luggage, crew, catering, fuel and
planes arriving at various airport entrances by cars, trains, trucks or by their own
movement. At check-in, passengers and luggage are separated, but along subsequent
parallel sub-scripts they undergo a more or less similar procedure for a security
check. At embarkation and loading, passengers, luggage, crew, catering and fuel
converge upon the plane. And so on. Along the way, data are collected, pro essed
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and dispatched at various nodes. It offers a more developed and precise notion of
what organizational cognition may be, beyond individual cognition.
Organizational scripts can in principle be reconstruted and plotted by an
analysis of process s of production, administration and communication in firms.
They can be coded 'in principle', because as in individuals, in organiztions scripts
may be tacit (Polanyi 1962, 1966, 1969); not known explicitly to anyone. In
organizations, people participate in a node of a script, perhaps without anyone
grasping the script as a whole. This connects with the distinction between
'procedural' and 'declarative' knowledge (Cohen & Bacdayan 1994, Cohen 1991).   
I propose that in general, when we put a magnifying glass to a node in a
script, the node is also seen to consist of one or more scripts. Also, in general a
script is embedded in higher level scripts, in the sense that either it forms a node in
such a script or produces a substitution into such a node. In other words: scripts
contain subscripts and are part of or feed into superscripts. Organizational scripts
have a nesting of subscripts, going down into scripts embodied in neural networks of
people. They may form part of superscripts in the form of organizational networks,
industries, economies and the world economy.
The functioning of people in nodes of organizational scripts is governed by
their 'reactivi y' to events (Saraph 1994). A well developed (richly structured) fo m
of reactivity is based on a 'repertoir ': terms that may serve as substitutions into
nodes, a choice procedure for selecting among them, and an implementation of such
substitutions.
The choice procedure in a repertoire requires cognitive capacities: percep-
tion (awareness, sensitivity to stimulus), interpretation (meaning creation,
understanding, knowledge) and evaluation (goal congruence). The scope of a
repertoire refers to the set of terms, and this may be narrow or wide. The choice
procedure may be flexible, i.e. variable under change of conditions, or strict.
Implementation requires skill, commitment and energy. The choice procedure is
closely related to the notion of sense: the way in which the choice of substitution into
nodes takes place. People may be involved in different nodes of a script, and in
different scripts within a firm. They are certainly involved in many scripts outside of
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their role in firm, 'qua persona' (Ring & v.d.Ven, 1994), and therefore have a range
of repertoires. Reciprocation may yield a carry-over of substitutions or nodes
between inside and outside scripts, but this is restricted to the extent that choice
procedures are strict. People may be rotated across nodes or scripts.  
3.3 Management of scripts
Efficient performance of a script requires appropriate substitutions, which requires
appropriate repertoires. A crucial question of management is this: how to guide the
development of repertoires so as to achieve an adequate balance between continuity
for the sake of good performance, and adaptation of repertoires and the
configuration of scripts for the sake of survival under changing conditions. To affect
reactivity one needs reactivity to that reactivity. Reactivity to one's own reactivity
constitutes self-awareness (Saraph 1994). The step to such self-awarenes may seem
like second order learning, but in our analysis the change of one's own repertoires
may emerge from the process of development set out before, if room and opportunity
are allowed for generalization, differentiation, and reciprocation, to achieve innova-
tion.
 Should management manage the r activity of workers by specifying their
repertoires? Traditional notions of 'strategic planning' seem to be based on that
perspective. How does management obtain the appropriate meta- eactivity
(reactivity to workers' reactivity)? For that, it should have self-awaren s ; re ctivity
to its reactivity to the reactivity of workers. On what learning would that be based?
Or should it subject its meta-reactivity to the people's reactivity to th t, and then
react to that reactivity? In other words, should it govern by feedback to its governan-
ce? Or should management rather govern on the basis of the self-awareness of
people; on the basis of people's reactivity to their own reactivity, according to the
logic of change?
When we apply our theory of learning as development of scripts, it connects
with the distinction in the literatur  on organizat onal learning between innovation of
components and 'architectural innovation' (Henderson & Clark 1990). The nodes
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correspond with the components and the 'architecture' with the way in which the
nodes are connected in a logical, causal or temporal order. Architectural innovation
constitutes second order learning, in which nodes from different scripts are
recombined into a novel script. The anecdote goes that Henry Ford was inspired to
his invention of the assembly line by the composition of rder packages in a mail-
order firm: delivery boxes on a belt moving past attendants sitting in front of shelves
of products, and putting something in the box or not according to the order slip
attached to the box. It was quite a leap to substitute this script for the old script of
one craftsman assembling different parts on a given spot. Movement of a carrier
(box, car frame) is substituted for the moving of parts. Again, terms are switched
between nodes, this time by reciprocation from a mail-order script. 
After invention, we are back at the first stage of consolidation: the removal
of ill-fitting remnants from previous scripts, rearrangement of nodes, etc. I give two
further illustrations. When building construction shifted from wood to iron and later
steel, this was first attempted as a mere functional substitute of a new material in the
script of wood construction. Many nodes remained the same. For example, heating
and cooling as a method to harden wood seems similar to heat ng and cooling to
harden iron. But unlike wood, metal can be welded. At first, wedge shaped connecti-
ons required for wood construction were retained while for metal they do not make
functional sense, so that this node in the construction script was later dropped.
Later, when plastic started to replace metal, it was treated like metal in being shaped
on a mould. Pouring or pressing plastic was substituted for pouring or pressing steel
into a mould. Subsequently better use of the material properties was made in the
cheaper procedure of blowing a stream of plastic into shape12. Before el ctric light
was implemented in cars, direction indicators were mechanical swivelling devices: a
manual script was mechanised. When electrical light came, it was first built into the
swivelling device (substituted into an existing node), until someone hit upon the
                    
12
 With the added advantage of getting rid of the "male" part of the mould, thus reducing
the "transaction specificity" of the investment.
46
much cheaper (because non-mechanical) device of a blinking light (replacement of a
node). The prior solution in retrospect seems quite ridiculous.
 The sequence of stages satisfies conditions of survival. The condition that
during the development of novelty there must remain sufficient contin ity as a basis
for production. As we develop scripts, the show must go on. Furthermore, it is by
the process of generalization and differentiation that we develop the motive to
innovate: established practice is getting messed up with differentiation, and misfits in
different contexts ('tags') accumulate. F rthermore, by the identification of misfits,
and comparison with other practices that we run up against, we obtain hints and the
elements for 'novel combinations' that seem promising or at least interesting. How
else would we obtain the incentives for innovation, and indications where to look for
it? It is counterproductive to drop and replace operating procedures too soon, before
one knows its limits and possibilities for replacem nt. It leads to random drift rather
than improvem nt (Lounamaa & March 1987).
Scripts can be retained, in the sense of being present in knowledge in a
procedural or declarative sense, in a weak or a strong form. In a weak form, only the
set of nodes is retained, but in strong form also the 'archit cture', in terms of logical,
causal or temporal connections between the nodes, in the script. Note that one can
procedurally retain a script in strong form (there is an architecture), without
knowing it in a declarative sense. One may also retain a script procedurally only in
weak form. In that case one is in a stage of trying to cope with a novel modus
operandi without a determinate architectu e; he beginning of a new script, which
has not yet consolidated into a prototype. An organization can have procedural
'knowledge' in a strong sense, without any person in the organization having it, by
having a script, embodied in a given modus operandi, which involves multiple people
who all have strong knowledge of only part of the script (procedurally or declara-
tively), or only have weak knowledge of the entire script. Such a script can be stable
under turnover of people, if new entrants into the script are adequately instruct d
(procedurally or declaratively). Such procedural organizational knowledge can
become declarative, by specification of the script in operating procedures.
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Corresponding to the distinction between procedural and declarative
knowledge, there are different ways of obtaining (learning) or transferring (teaching)
a script. On the level of the individual person, one can learn declaratively, as a
student, by studying a schematic representation of the prototype of the script, as a
standard operating procedure, encoded in some form. This requires that the teacher
offer declarative, encoded knowledge. One can also learn procedurally, as an
apprentice, by imitating observed behaviour of one or more 'masters', in a
'community of practice' (Brown & Duguid 1991), and trying it out in practice,
subject to correction by that community. In this way, procedural knowledge is a
social construction, in a context of application (Lave 1988).
For procedural learning, distance matters more than f r declarative learning,
because it requires more than reading documents: observing a practice, in its
context, and having one's own performance observed for correction, perhaps
requiring also touch, hearing, smelling. Furthermore, it requires familiarity and trust
to built up in the 'community of practice'. In other words, procedural learning
requires multiple media, and  ongoing interaction in various contexts. When
knowledge is procedural and tacit, it is difficult to license, and one may need a joint
venture, with joint production, to establish transfer (Kogut 1988).
Generally, when firms grow large, with the need and opportunity of
delegation and specialization in different activities in different departments,
procedural knowledge with its direct, face to face visual and oral coordination and
communication no longer suffice, and ways of doing things must be made explicit
and explainable, i.e. must be turned into declarative knowledge, and must be
documented to form instructions and SOP's across departments or subsidiaries. In
other words: transformation into declarativ  knowledge and codification are required
for diffusion over large distances and many people.
Procedural knowledge can in principle, and to a certain extent, be elicited to
be encoded and systematized in the form of declarative knowledge. This can be very
useful. In the 17th century, when Holland was the global leader in shipping, the
Dutch built ships on the basis of only rough sketches, with detailed manual instructi-
ons by the designer at the shipyard. Apprentices had to accompany the master to the
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yard to learn to imitate his craft. There were many quarrels between master and
builders about interpretation of instructions, measures etc. The British invented the
use of detailed technical drawings and written specifications for construction. This
provided a basis for more delegation, more precision and contractual clarity in
construction, scientific method and research in design, and enabled formal teaching
in classrooms to larger numbers of students. In other words, it reduced transaction
costs. Thus, it contribued to a number of factors which caused the British to
surpass the Dutch.
But often, in the transmission from procedural to declarative and from tacit
to encoded knowledge elements get lost. In declarative teaching, next to the prototy-
pe, some of the main differentiated tr cks may be included, plus perhaps some of the
anomalies tagged onto the script. But complete transmission would yield a regress:
one would need to specify all subscripts and superscripts, and at some point these
are bound to remain tacit. In any finite explanation one cannot keep on explaining
the terms of the explanation. Good teaching requires illustrative practice. Good
practice, with all its inveterately tacit elements, rich experience with different tracks
of scripts and tagged anomalies, with corresponding 'work-arounds', cannot without
any unspecified residual be completely canonized i to written procedures, manuals
or training programmes (Brown & Duguid 1991). It is one of the pitfalls of
management to think that it can be. The inadequacy of it is illustrated when proces-
ses break down because people 'work to rule'. It is also illustrated in the insight that
for diffusion of knowledge it may be better to rotate staff than written rules or
procedures (Cohen & Bacdayan 1994).
The building of repertoires can proceed in different ways:
Specification. This entails the imposition of coded contents of repertoires that are to
be adopted. This clearly requires declarative knowledge of the scripts. In innovative
activities, after invention and at the beginning of the consolidation stage, this is
impossible, because the performance is not yet determinate, and is largely tacit.
Next, when it is beyond that stage, things get lost in the trancription. The result
constiutes a mere datum for the recipient, and his performance depends on his
capacity to absorb it and transform it into informatio , and from there into perfor-
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mance. If, for example, the perception, interpretation or choice in a prescribed
repertoire conflicts with similar procedures in the recipient's existing repertoires, it
literally does not make 'sense'. Apart from these complications, prescription may
work when the need for continuity is paramount.
Imitation. Determine an exemplar of model performance, demonstrate it, and let
people imitate it. Perhaps with some documentary support (there may be
combinations between this mode of imitation and the previous mode of prescription).
Imitation can happen at an earlier stage of development than presc iption on the
basis of transcription, when knowledge is still procedural rather than declarative, but
not too early, because the performance requires a certain amount of stability to be
imitated. It entails that the recipint forms his own repertoir  by imitaion of model
performance. Since a given performance can be achieved on the basis of different
repertoires, in other words repertoire is under-determine  by its performance (in the
same way that theory is under-determin d by its predictions), this may lead to consi-
derable deviations from the model as circumstances change. The recipient may have
imported elements from repertoires in other scripts, probably including scripts from
his personal experience. Furthermore, according to my epistemology, cognitive
categories, which are part of repertoires, develop in interaction with the physical and
social environment, according to stages discussed before. This may be good, since
the first (importation from other scripts) provides a source of variety, and the second
(development from application) allows for testing and for a connection between
adaptaion and current performance. It requires appropriate self-awareness of the
people involved. Management may want to affect this self-reactivity of people, and
the question comes up again on a higher level whether this is to be done by speci-
fication of a repertoire (for people to adapt their reperoires), or the setting of models
for imitation. The basic idea is that management may want to somehow restrict the
direction of change, to maintain sufficient continuity, or to guide the change in the
direction of certain overarching goals. Full repertoires for affecting the change of
reactivity seems unlikely: one would have to be able to predict what cannot be
predicted. More likely would be simpler institutions to restrict or guide the change.
Here, one thinks of the role of culture as an institutio : certain models of conduct,
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embodied in myths, may provide a model for goal selection, and certain rituals may
confirm certain practices for the sake of continuity.
Management of meetings. Since according to my theory cognitive categories
develop from interaction with the physical and social environment, one can influence
change of repertoires yet more indirectly, by governing the environment in which
people develop their categories. A main instrument here is the pattern in which
people communicate and meet; in other words the design of scripts; in other words
organizational structure. In this way also one could affect the balance between
continuity and change. But such management by structure wo ld require a certain
amount of structural flexibility. And since the effect is very indirect, it would be
difficult to predict.
3.3 Identity and boundaries of the firm
What happens when someone drops out from a process? Does it change the identity
of the firm? Or would that require a larger scale replacement of entire scripts? If
scripts cross boundaries of the firm, where do those boundaries lie?
Replacement of a person, to maintain his role in a node, can be done better
to the extent that the role is encoded, so that it can be transferred to a replacement.
Or conversely: to the extent that knowledge is tacit, the 'dynamic transaction costs'
of transferring it are higher. However, in case of tacit knowledge replacement is not
hopeless. People who worked together with the missing person may by imitation be
able to supplant him to some extent. Or one may call in a similar speciali t from
outside. 
This is related to the problem of spill-over to competitors through a partner.
To the extent that knowledge is more tacit and procedural, and the dynamic transac-
tion costs are consequently higher, the risk is lower than when knowledge is docu-
mented or embodied in hardware. Spill-over of tacit knowledge w uld require
transfer of staff: either staff stationed at the partner, or the partner's staff coming
over to watch and imitate performance. And this would need to be followed by
similar transfer between the partner and one's competitor. But w  note that this may
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in fact be more difficult to control, because the transfer may be more invisible than
the copying of documents.
People may have a stake in maintaining the tacitness of their knowledge,
because it enhances their power. Thus it is understandable, for example, that
accountants resisted automation, for its ability to encode their tacit expertise, and
are losing status and salary now that automation has pushed through.
Rotation of personnel across roles (nodes in scripts) can have several effects
and purposes. One is to spread tacit knowledge, in connection with the previous
point. A second is to cover against the risk of knowledge dropping out when a
person drops out. A third is to facilitate and stimulate innovation in the form of
generalization and differentiation. A fourth is to loosen personal ties in which
interests of people 'qua persona' go against the interests of the firm.
So, a firm can maintain its scripts in spite of turnover of people. But what if
it loses or replaces entire scripts? Will its identity change? It would, if we identified
the identity of a firm with its collection of scripts. But to the extent that scripts need
to adapt, this would indicate that firms need to continually hange their identity.
Earlier we indicated that adaptation may not be feasible in the form of renewing the
specification of roles, and that it may require imitation of role models or manage-
ment by meeting, and that this may be guided by guiding the process of
development, by imposing restrictions of timing, and limiting or directing the scope
of generalization, differentiation and reciprocation, by means of organizational
culture. Perhaps we could identify organizational identity with its culture rather than
the set of scripts. 
We still face the question how with a single culture one can coach the
development of different parts of the firm in different stages of development, to
combine narrow focus in one part with chaotic diversity in another. Perhaps this
yields yet another perspective on the boundaries of the firm, and the tendency to hive
off activities in independent units. Traditionally, from TCE, there are the arguments
of static efficiency: economy of scale and specialization, and the market incentives
of having to secure one's own survival. We added considerations of dynamic
efficiency: pressures of globalization, in races in technologies and markets, and
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increasing product differentiation, in output and input markets, with the resulting
complexity and turbulence, force firms to narrow their focus on core competencies,
and to compensate the resulting lack of scope of exploration by me ns of partners in
networks. We also added the epistemological argument that one needs 'outside
intelligence' not only for the sake of efficiency, but also as a result of the path-
dependency of knowledge, which prevents the ability to perceive, interpret and
understand all relevant developments. Together, these two points yield the notion of
'external economy of cognitive scope' (Nooteboom, 1992). Now we add another
consideration: the need to hive off activities to prevent incompatib lities in culture,
for the guidance of development of scripts in different stages of development.
When scripts extend across boundaries of firms, to utilize the benef ts of
disintegration, there needs to be coordination, in the form of either interaction or
standards at the interfaces (modularity; Langlois & Robertson, 1995), as discussed
in Part 1. The latter requires that knowledge is to some extent coded (non-tacit). If it
is tacit, coordination has to take place by personal interaction and temporary
exchange of staff. This tends to be the case to the extent that the knowledge is
newer. Langlois & Robertson pointed out the need for re-integration of activities in
innovation, to ensure post-innovation consistency across interfaces. But they also
acknowledged that in 'radical innovation', disintegrat on into 'entrepreneurial
networks' is again necessary. We can further enrich the argument with our present
theory. When innovation is in the stage of parametric change (generalization), the
structure of the script remains the same, and consistency with the script of novel
substituions has to be ensured. But when change is more structural, and ertainly
when it enters the stage of reciprocation, the structure of scripts themselves is
broken up, and to maintain coordination at that stage entails maintena ce of scripts,
which inhibits innovation in the form of novel combinations of odes and subscripts
from diverse scripts from outside and inside the firm.
There is evidence to support this interpretation. While fundamental scientific
discoveries and novel basic technology is a job for large laboratories of government
or big industry, their application in the generation of novel product-technology-
market combinations is difficult to fit in large bureaucratic organizations. This
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explains why such developments have often been achieved outside large firms, in
smaller, novel, independent firms, often started by inventors who could not achieve
the radical change within the large firm where the invention was made. Examples
are: self-service retailing (Nooteboom, 1984a), Computer-Aided Design (Rothwell
& Zegveld, 1985), micro-computers (Apple instead of IBM).
In fact, I expect that the present surge of attention to networks of firms
arises from the fact that there is a wide potential for applications of novel basic
technologies, in a variety of novel combinations. I also propose that the argument
contributes to the explanation of Schumpeter's thesis that at the beginning of a long
cycle in the economy there is a swarming of innovations in small firms13.
                    
13
 I don not in any wish to suggest that in that stage small firms are universally better than
large ones. or that economy of scale no longer obtains. I hold the view that small and large
firms have complementary roles to play (Nooteboom, 1994).
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